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In the Suprente Court of the 
State of Utal1 
FLORENCE BUCKLEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STANLEY COX and ALICE T. C'OX, 
his wife, and KARL COX, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
CASE 
NO. 7730 
(Numbers in parentheses preceded by "JR'' refer to 
pages in Judgment Roll file; plain numbers in parentheses 
refer to pages in Transcript). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In this action the plaintiff, Florence Buckley, brought 
suit against the defendants for damages for use of a drive-
way and to quiet title to the driveway as against the de-
fendants. The complaint alleges: "2. That the plaintiff 
is the owner of .the home and premises known as 914 North 
University Avenue, in Provo, Utah County, State of Utah, 
and more particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
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2 
Commencing 4.54 chains West and 2.07-1/3 chains 
South 1~ o West and North 89~ o West 4 rods of the 
Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 7 South of 
Range 2 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said 
point of beginnng being on the South line of the Stan-
ley Cox land ; thence along said line North 8914 o West 
8 rods, more or less to the East line of University Ave-
nue; thence along the East line of said avenue South 
1~ o West 1.46 chains more or less the north line of 
a street; thence along the North line of said street 
·South 89° East 8.00 rods more or less; thence North 
1~ o East 1.46 chains, more or less to beginning. 
''3. That the North 12 feet of the above described 
property constitutes a driveway owned by the plaintiff and 
used by her as a means of ingress and egress to and from 
the rear of her said premises;-" (JR 3, 4). 
Count one of the complaint is for damages for use of 
driveway by the defendants and the second count is to quiet 
title to the driveway as against the defendants. 
The defendants answered the ~complaint and counter-
claimed alleging that the property line dividing the prop-
erties was at the center of the driveway and that it was a 
joint driveway for the properties of plaintiff and defend-
ants and further that by adverse user for more than 30 
years by the defendants and their predecessors they had 
acquired a right to the use of said driveway by prescription 
and asked judgment quieting title to their use of the follow-
ing, a right of way across the south six feet of the follow-
ing described real estate in Utah County, Utah, to-wit: 
Commencing 66-1/3 links South and 4.54 chains 
North 89~ o West of the Northeast corner of Section 
1, Township 7 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; thence North 891_4 o West 3 chains; 
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thence South 114 o West 1.50 chains; thence South 
891ft o East 3 chains; thence North 11J! a East 1.50 
chains to the place of beginning. 
and of the six feet immediately south thereof as a joint 
driveway as appurtenant to the property of plaintiff and 
defendants ( JR 9) . 
At the trial of the case plaintiff testified that she had 
given permission for the use of the driveway to Heber Tay-
lor (12). She allowed Mr. Cox to use it when he came 
there (13). The cement approach to the drive was put in 
while Mr. Taylor lived there but Mr. Cox paid for half of it 
(14). She testified that the Coxes had claimed a right to 
the drive before 1948 but that they had never had any 
trouble prior to that time (18). That the check was. given 
in payment of rent for all the time he ever used it. She 
had never asked for the payment (25). Admitted she had 
testified on deposition that \Ve had asked Mr. Cox a good 
many times not to use the driveway but he has just gone 
right on and used it. Asked him not to use it the first time 
a long, long time ago, Well, we will say twenty years. That 
he had claimed a right to use it and had continued to use 
it since that time. Cox used it whenever he wanted to, just 
like it was his road, like we didn't have any claim to it at 
all. Cox had used it that way at all times since he moved 
there (26-28). That she had testified on her deposition 
that the Cox property line had been determined when the 
property v;as divided. That there are stumps of the old 
fence still in there ( 29) . She was then asked: "Q. You 
testified on your deposition that Mr. Cox had always 
claimed the right to use of the driveway since he had been 
there? A. Yes, he has." (30). On re-direct examination 
she testified that she had said in her deposition: "Q. 
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And after Mr. Cox came there isn't it true also that what 
use he made of the property, of the driveway, he made by 
permission? A. By permission. Q. And sufferance on 
your part? A. Yes." (35). 
Mr. Beazer, a surveyor, identified Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"C" and stated that the dotted line, 4.5 feet south of the 
north line is where two old stubs of posts were set. On 
cross examination he stated he couldn't determine any old 
posts along the survey line (59). That the commencement 
point of the plaintiff's description would be 3.9 feet into 
the driveway (61). That the inclusion in the description 
of "said point being the southeast corner of the land of 
Stanley Cox" would not change the line ( 63). 
For the defendants Mr. Heber Taylor testified that he 
owned the Cox property for five years from 1922 to 1927 
(65-66). That the former owner showed him the north 
boundary line, a fence (66). That while he owned it he 
had a talk with plaintiff and "she indicated that we owed 
her half of this cost of this strip because of the relation-
ship existing in terms of the right of way." The question 
arose in conversation with her as to the payment of the 
half cost of the cement strip on the parking because of it 
being a joint right of way there ( 68-69) . Plaintiff never 
gave him permission to use way _and he never asked her · 
to allow him to use it (69). On cross-examination he tes-
tified that he claimed south of the hedge. Did not put his 
hedge south of where it was because there was a joint right 
of way there (71). Didn't recall talking with plaintiff ex-
cept her asking for the payment of half of the cost of the 
strip. It was because it was a joint right of way (72). 
Talk he had with plaintiff shortly after he left was con-
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cerning the payment of the half of the strip, cement strip 
(73). 
Mr. Cox testified that plaintiff had asked for the 
money and she informed him how much was owing for our 
half of the driveway ( 75). Made payment of $37.53 in 
September, 1928. No mention made at any time that pay-
ment was for rent (76). Told her at that time he intended 
to ue it and maintain it as a right of way (77). Has used 
the driveway every time it was needed (77). Used it once 
or twice a week during summer and not so much during 
the winter ( 78) . Plaintiff said nothing about use of 
driveway until about two years ago or a year ago. Hauled 
some sand and put on driveway in early 30's.. Put some 
clinkers on driveway and also some gravel (79). On cross-_ 
examination he testified that the writing on the check, de-
fendants' exhibit "1" "curb and gutter" was on it when it 
was delivered and that when he filed it he wrote "right of 
way'' on it (83). Parked car in driveway quite a. bit dur .. 
ing '27, '28, and '29. Always stopped there when he came 
home for lunch. About six times a week (88). Florence 
Buckley objected when he told her roomers no~ to park on 
drive at night in 1948 (90). Had traveled back 12 rods 
on driveway (99). Used it_ to bring lumber in 1944 (101). 
Always has had openings from driveway to Cox; property 
(102). 
The defendant Mrs. Cox testified that·. they used .. the 
driveway every year. Hauled lumber in for bee boxes and 
the boxes out. Hauled fertilizer for their garden. Kept a 
trailer there except in winter. Hauled building materials 
in there and the boys kept their car in the garage at rear 
of the lot. (115-). Before they built garage drove car about 
2/3's of ·the way back and turned in to their place and 
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parked car (115). No trouble over use of driveway until 
last 2 years (118). Saw Stanley Cox put clinkers on drive-
way but not all times he did it (120). Put them on every 
year until converted to, oil about 4 years ago (121). In 
1938 plaintiff asked her to trim hedge and keep her side 
of driveway clean ) 122-123) . 
Karl Cox testified that when he was young his father 
made him help carry out ashes and some of ashes went on 
driveway. That went on from time he was big enough to 
do it until he went into army in 1945. Had used driveway 
all his life (125). 
For the plaintiff Clark Newell testified that there was 
a gate across driveway at coal house. Gates were taken 
down about 1940 (137). Had never seen Cox use drive-
way (139). Would go there at six in morning and seven 
at night. Sometimes at noon (141). Never saw Heber 
Taylor use drive. No opening to Cox property from drive-
way back there (143). No break in hedge for eight rods 
back until 1940 (144). 
Fred J. Richan testified for plaintiff that he knew 
premises and saw Coxes use it and it was all in recent years. 
Saw vehicle belonging to defendants on drive during last 
20-25 years (146). Said Cox said "Well, I have exagger-
ated on my measurements a little." (148). Would usually 
go there Sundays or holidays. Twice a week and usually 
at night (149-150). 
Ern Buckley testified for plaintiff as follows: They 
never had any trouble because they never used the road 
any more than just probably to get back and forth. Never 
saw Cox haul a load of gravel or ·cinders on driveway. They 
never used the road any more than just probably to get 
back and forth ( 152) . There were two sets of gates ( 153). 
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Plaintiff was asked if she remembered a conversation 
\vith Mr. Cox in which he said he \Vas going to use the 
right of way and that plaintiff had said "That is your priv-
ilege". Didn't remember it. Didn't know whether she 
told him that or not (160-161). She said she had testified 
in her deposition that ,.,Q. But more so the last two 
years? A. He has taken it over the last two years, it 
doesn't belong to us any more. Q. But before that he 
used it? A. He used it whenever he wanted, we didn't 
say anything to him." (162). She also admitted that she 
had testified that: ''A. Yes. Of course after Mr. Cox 
got his road on the north then I thought that would re-
lieve us, he wouldn't have to have two roads to his place, 
you know. Q. But he continued even after that? Yes, 
he continued to use it. A. And claimed the right to use 
it? A. And claimed the right to use it.--'' (163). 
The Court made its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and judgment that the plaintiff is the owner of the 
real property described in plaintiff's complaint and quieted 
title to it, including the driveway along the North side 
thereof, and restrained and enjoined the defendant from 
using said real property or in any manner interfering with 
plaintiff's use and enjoyment, including said driveway. 
The defendants moved for a modification of the judg-
ment or for a new trial. The motion was denied and de-
fendants, jointly and severally appeal from the judgment. 
STATMENT OF POINTS 
1. The evidence is insufficient to support finding of 
fact No. 2 (JR 16). 
2. The evidence is insufficient to suport the finding 
of fact that the claims of said defendants, and each of them, 
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are inferior to the rights and claims of the plaintiff, Flor-
ence Buckley, and are without any right whatsoever, and 
the said defendants, Stanley, :Cox,· and Alice T. Cox, his 
wife, and Karl Cox, have no estate, right, title or interest 
in or to the said above described property, including said 
driveway, or any part thereof ( JR 17) . 
3. The evidence :is insufficient to support finding of 
fact No. 9a (JR 17~18).. 
4. The evidence is insufficient to support ·the finding 
of fact that it was untrue that these defendants and the 
predecessors of these defendants have used the same as a 
joint driveway for more than thirty years next preceding 
the commencement of this action; that said· use has been 
,made under a claim of right and adverse to the· claim of 
plaintiff to the ownership thereof and to the claim~ if any, 
of the predecessors in interest of plaintiff · (JR 18). 
5. · The evidence is insufficient to support.· the find-
ing of fact that it was untrue that these defendants have 
used said driveway to drive automobiles and trucks of the 
same and to walk thereon for more than twenty-two years 
prior to the commencement of this · action and that such 
use was consented to by the plaintiff (JR 18). 
6. The evidence is insufficient to· support· finding- of 
fact No. 9b (JR 18-19). 
7. The evidence is· insufficient to support the finding 
'that' the allegation of defendants was untrue that they had 
a right also by adverse user for more than thirty years 
by these defendants and their predecessors in interest 
(JR 18). 
8. That the evidence is insufficient to support the 
finding of fact that it was untrue that these defendants and 
the predecessors in interest of these defendants have used 
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the said right of way as a point driveway for more than 
thirty years next preceding the commencem~nt of this ac-
tion; that said use has been made under a claim of right 
and adverse to the claim of plaintiff to the ownership there-
of and to the claim, if any, of the predecessors in interest 
of plaintiff (JR 19). 
9. The evidence is insufficient to support finding of 
fact No. 9c (JR 19). 
10. The evidence is insufficient to support finding of 
fact No. 9d (JR 19). 
11. The findings and conclusions are insufficient to 
support the judgment. 
12. Appelants' motion for a new trial should have 
been granted (JR 26-28). 
13. That the court erred in entering judgment against 
the defendants that they had no right to the use of the 
driveway set forth and described in defendants' answer 
and counterclaim (JR 21-23). 
ARGUMENT 
It is the contention of appellants that \vhere, as in this 
case, the plaintiff admits that she knew the defendants 
claimed a right to the adverse use of the driveway and 
does nothing, that when the period of limitations has 
passed, the rights are established. Where knowing that the 
defendants claim, as of right; the use of a driveway for a 
period of more than twenty years, and the plaintiff permits 
or allows its continuance by sufferance for such period of 
time, she may not, by claiming such use to have been by 
permission, toll the running of the statute of limitations~ 
Point One. The evidence is conclusive that the north 
:3.9 feet of thedriveway is not within the description of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
premises set forth in paragraph 1 of the findings (61). 
The remaining points, except Point Eleven, are re-
lated and really present the main contention of appellants 
in this case. They will be treated together. All such points 
refer to the findings of fact on which the judgment is based 
that the defendants had not established a right to the 
driveway either as joint owner or by adverse possession. 
To establish an easement by prescription the use must 
be for 20 years, open and adverse, or to the knowledge of 
the servient owner, ·continuous, visible and under claim 
of right. Norback vs. Board of Directors, 84 Utah 506, 
37 Pac. 2 339. In the case of Fogarty vs. F1ogarty, 61 Pac. 
570, a California -case, the law is stated as follows: 
"2. Where plaintiff claimed water diverted by de-
fendants by adverse user for six years, a finding that 
neither plaintiff nor his grantors have had open, no-
torious, adverse use of the water does not negative 
plaintiff's claim of adverse user, since all that is neces-
sary to make a use adverse is a claim of right and 
knowledge of the claim in the adverse party, it may 
be adverse without being open and notorious." 
The former owner, Mr. Heber Taylor, testified that he 
was shown_ the property and that half of the driveway was 
his ( 68-69) . Plaintiff made demand for payment of half 
the cost of the runway into the drive (72-73). He owned. 
the property from 192.2-1927 (65-66). Stanley Cox testi-
fied that plaintiff had asked for money for hi~ half of 
driveway and this was paid in September, 1928 (75-76). 
He told her at that time he intended to use it and main-
tain it as a right of way (77). He has used it every time 
it was needed and about on-ce or twice a week during the 
summer and not so much during the winter (77-78). 
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The plaintiff in this case established every element of 
adverse use and possession in her direct testimony and on 
cross examination. She admitted on cross examination 
that on her deposition in this case she had testified that 
Cox had claimed a right to use the drive\vay and he had 
continued to use it whenever he wanted to, just like it was 
his road and like \Ve didn't have any claim to it at all. Cox 
used it that way at all times since he moved there (26-28). 
She was then asked: "Q. You testified on your deposi-
tion that Mr. Cox had always claimed the right to use of 
the driveway since he had been there? A. Yes, he had." 
(30). On re-direct examination she testified that she had 
also said in her deposition: "Q. And after Mr. c·ox came 
there isn't it true also that what use he made of the prop-
erty, of the driveway, he made by permission? A. By 
permission. Q. And sufferance on your part? A. Yes." 
(35). 
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Edition, 
Unabridged, gives the definition of Sufferance as 1. Pa-
tient endurance; long suffering; forbearance under provo-
cation. In other words we have here the testimony of the 
plaintiff that Stanley Cox had always claimed a right to 
use the driveway and had used it as though it were his 
own and as though she had no claim to it and she had pa-
tiently endured under this provocation. What more could 
be done to establish proof of adverse use of the driveway? 
This Court has frequently held that the testimony of 
a \vitness is no stronger than as shown by cross-examin-
ation. It was so decided in the case of Edwards vs. Clark, 
96 Utah 121, 83 Pac. (2) 1021. 
Quoting from Porter vs. Hunter at page 154 of the 
Pac. reports: 
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"(2) Plaintiff's testimony is no stronger than 
what he testified on cross-examination, and the evi-
dence elicited from him on cross-examination must be 
regarded as part of the evidence given by him in chief. 
Wilson v. Wagar, 26 Mich. 452. 
" ( 3) Defendant testified definitely to the terms 
of the contract, and, there being no denial by plaintiff 
on his cross-examination or at any time, it is beyond 
cavil that the contract was as alleged in defendant's 
answer, and that the contract as thus established by 
the testimony was not fulfilled by plaintiff." 
Defendant Stanley Cox testified to his claim to the 
right of way (77). There is no denial of this by plaintiff 
and in fact she testified that he had always made that 
claim (30) .. At the instance of her ·counsel she said that 
this use had been by sufferance on her part ( 35). If she 
had stoped the use of course the time element for adverse 
use could not have been established, but by permitting and 
suffering the Coxes to use the driveway knowing they 
claim such use as a right for a period of more than twen-
ty years, she is now estopped to deny their right to it. 
The finding that defendants had not used the prop-
erty adversely is simply not borne out by the testimony 
of the plaintiff herself. Such finding by the court is clear-
ly error. 
This Court in the case of Norback v. Board of Direc-
tors, etc., 84 Utah 506, 37 Pac. (2) 339, at page 344 quotes 
with approval as follows: 
"Thompson on Real Property, vol. 1 s.475, makes 
the following statement: 'In an action to establish a 
right of way by prescription the question is for the 
jury whether the use was under a claim of right, or 
was merely a matter of neighborly accommodation." 
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It \Vill also be noted that the north line of the Cox 
property is probably determined by an old fence 'that had 
been established many years before the Coxes bought the 
property. The surveyor testified that measuring from the 
line of the posts for a distance of six rods, the frontage of 
the Cox property, \vould put the line 4.5 feet inside the 
driveway. Mr. Cox testified that he had measured from 
the line of posts several times (80-81). Maybe Mr. ,Cox 
was mistaken in his claim to the center of the driveway 
but this mistake would not mitigate against his claim of 
right to the driveway during all the years he has been 
there. In the case of Bales vs. Pidgeon, an Indiana case 
reported at 29 N. E. 34, it is stated: 
"Where adjoining land owners agree upon their 
division line and establish a road supposed to be on 
the land of one of them, which road for 50 years is 
used by the subsequent owners of the land and by the 
public, the road cannot be closed by the owner of one 
of the tracts, when he finds by a re-survey that the 
road is on his land, instead of the adjoining as it was 
supposed to be.'' 
This would certainly seem the right answer as if there 
never \Vas a mistake and never a claim of something that 
actually did not belong to the claimant there would be no 
adverse possession or user. 
' 
With respect to Point Eleven the findings give the le-
gal description of the plaintiff's property and it does not 
cover the north 3.9 feet of the driveway. The correct de-
scription of this property was known by the plaintiff be-
fore suit and by the court on the evidence of Mr. Beazer. 
The finding limits the right of the plaintiff to that part of 
the driveway within the description given in the findings 
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of fact and this is not done in the judgment. Based on 
such finding. the court could not order the defendants to 
stay off all of the driveway. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence is con-
clusive that the right to use of the driveway by the de-
fendants has been established. They have used it under 
a claim of right to the knowledge of the owner for more 
than twenty years and she suffered them to use it during 
that period. She cannot now say that because she allowed 
them to make such use, knowing they claimed it as of 
right, that it is such use that will not ripen into an abso-
lute right. 
Defendants respectfully submit that because of such 
error, they, and each of them, are entitled to a reversal 
and to direction that judgment be entered for them and 
against the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
,.·J. C. HALBERSUEBEN, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants 
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